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Financialization and the third sector: Innovation in social housing bond markets 
1. Introduction  
In 2008 it became clear that the US subprime crash had spread to create a global financial 
crisis (GFC). In contrast to previous crises, the GFC was unique in that it permeated a diverse 
range of spaces, from global financial markets to households, destabilising financial 
institutions deemed too big to fail, and tipping debt laden governments into fiscal crises. 
While the crisis was global in scale, its antecedents can be traced to geographically 
concentrated defaults of US subprime mortgages, following a series of interest rate rises. 
One distinctive feature of the GFC is rooted in financial engineering, as these subprime 
mortgages were restructured to ‘remove’ risk through a process known as securitization, 
which enabled the revenue streams of mortgages to be sold to institutional investors as 
bonds (Marshall et al. 2011). This practice led to the accelerated financialization of 
residential real-estate, connecting regional savings and mortgage lenders to capital markets, 
creating risk conduits that would connect global financial centres, governments, households 
and consumers more closely together, facilitating a deeper and wider contagion of the crisis. 
Investor appetite for securitised real-estate bonds declined markedly since the GFC 
(Wainwright 2015). However, during the economic recovery a new residential bond market 
began to grow rapidly within the UK: housing association bonds. Subsequently, while the 
financialization of private real-estate through securitization has declined, the financialization 
of third sector real-estate has begun to grow. Housing Associations (HAs) receive 
government funding for development and maintenance, but since the Thatcherite 
governments of the 1980s, funding has been slowly reduced (cf. Aalbers et al. 2015). During 
this time, HAs obtained commercial loans from banks to meet their funding shortfall, which 
heralded the privatization of funding streams. However, post-GFC austerity politics have 
accelerated reductions to this government funding, while increased funding costs and 
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regulation has reduced the availability of bank loans for HAs, leaving them to turn to global 
capital markets and bond funding programmes.  
Global investors who previously purchased securitised bonds, for example, pension and 
insurance funds began to include regionally embedded HA bonds in their portfolios, which 
has privatised the funding of HAs and in doing so, has financialized these organisations. 
However, the financialization of HAs is not clear cut. While many private sector organisations 
experience negative outcomes through financialization (Pike 2006), many HAs have a non-
profit status, with social aims to house vulnerable and low income tenants, and support the 
local community. It can be argued that these core objectives are diametrically opposed to 
the politics of financialization and the provision of bondholder returns. Subsequently, this 
study provides a unique opportunity to examine how financialization has begun to permeate 
into the third sector, while initiating spatial and organisational change. 
This paper has 3 aims: First, it seeks to investigate the deepening of financialization into a 
new sphere of society and the economy: third sector HAs. In doing so, the paper will examine 
how localised spaces of HAs have become connected to global capital markets and investors, 
through London as an international finance centre. Second, we explore the tensions between 
financialization’s return seeking politics, and the charitable and local missions of HAs, in 
addition to the risks that can emerge through the development of bond programmes. Third, 
the paper seeks to examine the difficulties and potential solutions to managing these 
contradictory politics, while examining how the challenges in financializing HAs are 
inherently spatial. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 will examine recent research 
on financialization, particularly concerning real-estate markets and increasingly the public 
and third sector. This review will be used to frame the paper’s analysis. The section will also 
outline the research design of the study, from which the findings are drawn. Section 3 will 
investigate the emergence of a nascent bond market to provide HAs with access to capital 
markets. In this section, we then examine how bond market transactions grew after the GFC 
connecting local HAs to global capital markets through London, while unravelling the 
geographies of production and the effect of space in developing HA bonds. Section 4 will 
then explore some of the tensions between the politics of the third sector and 
financialization, while exploring new innovations that attempt to manage these issues. The 
final section will conclude the paper.  
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2. Financialization:  wider and deeper? 
The GFC has had a profound effect on global economies and societies. Although the crisis 
began to unfold in 2008, its effects have continued to ripple through the global financial 
system, with delicate recoveries propped up through a precarious combination of austerity 
and quantitative easing. It has become clear that prior to the crisis, financialization was 
successful in permeating everyday life (cf. Martin 2002), infiltrating individual (Langley 2007), 
household (Finlayson 2009) corporate (Pike 2006; Muellerleile 2006; Faulconbridge and 
Muzio 2009), regional, national and global spaces (Wainwright 2012; French at al. 2011; 
Krippner 2005; Stockhammer 2014). The deepening of financialization’s processes began to 
accelerate in the 1980s (Krippner 2005), connecting new actors and spaces to global circuits 
of capital, in addition to financial risks. In doing so, the deep and sustained impact of the GFC, 
has illustrated how wide and deep financialization’s politics have spread. As such, scholars 
have become increasingly concerned with how the mundane spaces of everyday life have 
become integrated within the realm of high finance and international capital (French et al. 
2011). In particular, this has led to the growth of literature that examines the financialization 
of real-estate space, connecting household spaces to global investors, spurring researchers 
to advance research on financialization through housing markets (Aalbers and Engelen 2015).  
 
2.1. Private sector: From equity markets to housing markets 
While researchers have sought to apply theories of financialization to real estate, this has 
become increasingly complex due to the proliferation of contested definitions concerning 
financialization (Engelen 2008). French et al. (2009) suggest that there are two particular 
framings of financialization. First, it is a term that describes growing power of finance over 
the economy and society. Second, it can be viewed as a conceptual tool to focus on the 
processes and role of technologies, metrics and values of financialization in shaping change 
across space. Even within the second, more critical approach, there are variations as to how 
financialization is viewed. For example, it can be viewed as the increasing role of financial 
motives in markets actors and institutions (Epstein 2005), or the increased power and 
dominance of financial actors markets and narratives, resulting in the reorganisation of firms, 
households and states (Aalbers 2015). In positioning our paper within these debates, we 
seek to drawn upon French et al’s. (2009) second identified sphere, utilising a softer sectorial, 
case study approach following other recent studies (Langley 2007; Leyshon and French 2009; 
Wainwright 2012; Froud et al. 2006; Krippner 2005). This will enable us to focus on the actors 
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involved in HA bond markets and to provide deeper insight into the power and processes of 
financialization that reshape the organizations and spaces of the third sector. 
This is important as earlier work on how financialization focussed on how its politics were 
applied through shareholder value metrics and the subsequent disciplining of executive 
management through corporate governance (Froud et al. 2000; Pike 2006). In short, 
executives’ remuneration and the security of their future employment was contingent on 
their ability to increase shareholder value, through increased stock prices and dividends. 
While research on the financialization of real-estate has grown considerably (Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014), studies have not been sufficiently critical in highlighting how 
financialization functions in the context of bond markets, despite much of the focus on 
securitised bonds. Shareholder value in equities can be enhanced through increased 
dividends and share prices (Froud et al. 2000; Wainwright 2012; Muellerleile 2009). However, 
real-estate bonds, such as medium term notes (MTNs) or residential mortgage backed 
studies (RMBS) (Langley 2006) tend to offer a fixed, or floating return, where the latter is 
based on interbank rates, not asset performance. Subsequently, bond holders cannot engage 
in corporate governance to shape organisational behaviour and performance through voting 
rights, they can only receive bond yield, making them passive in contrast to equity investors. 
Arguably, an alternative approach is required to understand the processes of financialization 
in real-estate markets. 
This paper suggests that the financialization of real-estate can be viewed in two alternative 
ways. First, an ‘equities-based’ approach to financialization would view mortgage lenders or 
commercial landlords as using bond programmes, such as securitization, to realise profits 
from asset revenue streams, that can be passed on to shareholders (Marshall et al. 2011; 
Wainwright 2012). Bond sales liquefy assets, providing a mortgage lender or landlord with 
profits that can be passed on as enhanced dividend returns for shareholders (Clark and Monk 
2014) and capital market intermediaries (Folkman et al. 2007). In this approach, shareholders 
through voting rights alter management behaviour by influencing mortgage lenders or 
landlords to issue bonds. Second, we suggest a new ‘bond-based’ approach to gain deeper 
insight into the practices of financialization in real-estate. As highlighted earlier, bond 
holders cannot influence the corporate governance of financial organisations, once they 
have bought a bond as they do not have shareholder voting rights. However, they are able to 
influence organisational behaviour in the event of a bond default, but also before bonds are 
issued. As will be explored later, potential bondholders can become involved in the design of 
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bonds; as they will only purchase the securities if bonds issuers follow certain rules and 
covenants which prescribe how they must behave (Cook et al. 2014). 
In order to access capital markets and raise finance, bond issuers such as HAs may need to 
redesign or reorganise their operations and activities, following the demands of potential 
investors and intermediaries.  To achieve this, new metrics and framings are developed 
(Froud et al. 2000), and changes can be made to issuer’s operational and business plans, 
creating immutable mobiles, which an issuer’s management must not deviate from, 
otherwise they risk triggering a default. Consequently, the financializing power of 
institutional investors and subsequent organisational change takes place through the 
formalization of risk management plans, prior to bond issuance, implemented through 
frozen discourses that discipline the bond issuer into maintaining a particular set of 
behaviours (Miller and Rose 2008; Beunza and Garud 2007; Bowker and Star 1999). In this 
second approach the financialization occurs before bonds are issued, where fixed boundaries 
constrain the issuer’s future behaviour over time, in contrast to an equity-based approach, 
where security owners can exercise their power at different times, voting on multiple 
changes and strategies while the security remains in circulation. Subsequently, it can be 
argued that real-estate financialization and the processes that change organisations do not 
occur throughout the lifetime of the issued security, like with equities, but before the bonds 
are issued.  This is a useful approach, as it can be used provide insight into how organisations 
without shareholders, become entangled with the politics of financialization, providing 
further insight to address the dearth of how residential real-estate is integrated within the 
political economy (Aalbers and Christophers 2015; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009).  
2.2. Third sector: From equity markets to non-markets 
 
While a more critical approach is required to understand the specific mechanisms of real-
estate financialization, a further shortcoming of recent studies has been the limited 
examination of how financialization has begun to penetrate the third sector. Earlier research 
has provided insight into how financialization permeated the public sector. For example, 
French et al (2011) have been careful to point out that while state institutions designed 
regulation to be compatible with financialization, the state too has become increasingly 
financialized. Since the 1980s, the implementation of new public management paradigms, 
performance management (Manville and Broad 2013) and the roll-back of the state, 
facilitated transactions in public finance initiatives (du Gay et al. 2012; Froud and Shaoul 
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2001; Froud 2003; Strickland 2013). More recently, researchers have drawn attention to how 
arms-length state infrastructure has also been undergoing financialization, through full and 
partial privatizations of utilities, healthcare and infrastructure (Aalbers at al. 2015; Ashton et 
al. 2014; Acerete, et al. 2011; O’Neill 2013), where the equity politics and knowledge of 
financialization are redeveloped to create new financial innovations through bricolage 
(Engelen et al. 2010). 
 
Despite this emerging body of work on non-market public sector financialization, researchers 
have only recently turned to explore how third sector organisations are also engaging with 
financialization. The third sector consists of social enterprises that have primarily charitable 
and social aims, and can take the legal form of: industrial and provident societies, mutuals, 
community interest companies and charities, for example. These organisations sit between 
the private and public sectors, do not often have shareholders, and are invariably controlled 
by independent trustees for the benefit of the community. Social enterprises need to be 
financially sustainable to meet their social aims, drawing upon a mixture of government 
funding, donations and their own commercial activities. However, in contrast to the politics 
of financialization, economic returns are secondary to the attainment of their charitable aims 
(Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008). While recent work has begun to examine the 
financialization of mutuals in finance and educational providers as charities, research in this 
field remains underdeveloped (Wainwright 2012; Marshall et al. 2011; Engelen et al. 2014; 
Jakovljevic at al. 2008; Aalbers et al. 2015). 
 
What is perhaps surprising about this nascent area of study, is how third sector organisations 
began to undergo financialization in the 1980s, although the process has begun to accelerate 
and deepen, particularly for social housing providers in Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, 
as governments are withdrawing their influence and funding from these organisations 
(Lennartz 2011; Rolnik 2013). This has seen the widespread adoption of performance 
management metrics and market-orientated narratives, where HAs have begun to displace 
social and regulatory frameworks with a private sector agenda, focussing on ‘asset 
management’, valuations and risk modelling (Gruis 2002; Kok and Driessen 2012; Manville 
and Broad 2013) making the sector more compatible with financialization. This compatibility 
is enhanced further by the public sector funding received by HAs which provide them with 
substantial revenue streams, which lend themselves well to financialization. This explains 
why the social housing sector in particular is undergoing financialization, in contrast to other 
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smaller charities in the third sector that have a limited asset and revenue base. Subsequently, 
research into the social housing sector will contribute to providing more integrative 
understandings of the role of housing in the political economy (Aalbers and Christophers 
2015; Bryan and Rafferty 2014).  
 
Aalbers et al. (2015) provide one of the first studies into the financialization of social housing 
in the Netherlands through their examination of Vestia’s 2011 bailout. HA Vestia nearly 
collapsed following extensive speculation in financial markets, inadequate financial 
supervision and poor understandings of financial products.  The Dutch experience is very 
similar to the near collapse of the UK’s Cosmopolitan Housing Association in 2013, which was 
subject to a rescue take over by the Sanctuary Housing Group (Altair 2014). In this case, 
accounting errors and strategic overextension funded through bond market liquidity led to 
the failure of the Cosmopolitan Housing Association and its subsidiaries (Altair 2014). This 
illustrates how financialization in the HA sector can undermine its primary social objectives, 
as losses on financial markets lead to the disposal of housing units and increases in rents for 
tenants (Aalbers et al. 2015). Despite these risks, post-GFC reductions in state funding, 
stemming from programmes of austerity and reduced tax receipts, have accelerated the 
financialization of HAs, as they seek to top-up their funding shortfalls through capital 
markets. A steady reduction of state funding since the 1990s, means that private financing in 
the sector is not new (Dieleman 1999), but the politics of austerity have deepened the role of 
capital markets in the day-to-day operations of HAs.  
 
As highlighted earlier, financialization through bond issuance can restructure the power 
relations of organisations, with external actors gaining indirect influence and power over 
their internal operations. This can affect organisational behaviour, strategies and practices 
(French et al. 2001; Pike 2008; Froud et al. 2006) that must become realigned with bond 
covenants (Cook et al. 2014), if bonds are to be issued. It can be argued that the politics and 
processes of financialization contradict the social purposes of HAs and it becomes less clear if 
meeting social objectives is ranked ahead of financial returns, since investors aim to deliver 
financialized returns for shareholders, often institutional investors supporting an asset-based 
welfare regime (Erturk and Solari 2007; Froud et al. 2002; Finlayson 2009; Langley 2006). In 
contrast, HAs aim to provide affordable, or below market rent accommodation, to vulnerable 
or low income tenants which include the disabled, elderly, and those on low incomes 
(Malpass 2000), while often providing wider community development and  social 
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programmes for tenants (cf. Lang and Novy 2014). These social objectives run contrary to the 
aims of financialization raising questions as to how these competing sets of politics may 
affect HAs, in addition to the spatial implications, in connecting them to global financial 
markets.  
 
2.3 Research design 
This paper draws primarily upon primary semi-structured interviews, and uses additional 
secondary sources to contextualise this data within a wide economic context. The empirical 
data was collected between 2014 and 2015 and consists of 30 interviews conducted within 
the UK. The interviewees consist of directors, associates, analysts and managers that work in 
investment banks, commercial banks, boutique finance houses, policy-makers, industry 
representatives, investors and HAs, large and small in addition to management consultants. 
These respondents work within the UK HA bond market sector in issuing, placing and 
consuming bonds backed by revenue from HA rents.  
 
The HA bond market was limited in size until the GFC, and is still managed by a small number 
of financial institutions, and a growing base of investors. As such, key participants could be 
located through systematic searches of the internet. Records of registered HAs held by the 
Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), provided insight into registered HAs. Further 
searches revealed the largest and smallest HAs by turnover and housing unit portfolio, 
whose websites provide insight into their use of capital markets through available bond 
prospectus documentation. Snowballing and initial interviews, in addition to searches of 
financial institutions’ websites, revealed which financial services firms are active in the 
market, supplemented by bond fund documentation, to identify investors and the financial 
and sector press (e.g Financial Times and Social Housing). Participant names were then 
located through corporate websites and reports.  
 
The research interviews were semi-structured to enable the interviewees to provide 
additional information and flexibility in their answers, and to account for their own 
experiences and specific expertise. The questions sought to examine the history and initial 
formation of the bond market, but also the rapid growth after the GFC, in addition to how 
innovations occurred and how new HAs and investors have begun to enter the market, and 
the conditions that required this development. The questions also examined the strategies, 
practices and difficulties that emerge in reconciling the different aims and politics of the 
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different stakeholders. The duration of the interviews ranged between 45 minutes at 2 hours. 
Each interview was digitally recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were then thematically 
coded, prior to their analysis. The analysis was also supported by materials and documents 
suggested by interviewees, including bond documentation and market reports for further 
triangulation.  
 
3. Financializing housing associations 
In 1979, the ruling Conservative government in Britain sought to privatise the public housing 
within its political economy (Crook 1986). The ‘Big Bang’ in 1988 assisted in facilitating this 
plan, as newly liberalised financial markets were permitted to release funding for the 
privatization of Britain’s housing. These two key changes set the scene for the 
financialization of Britain’s political economy of housing (cf. Aalbers and Christophers 2014). 
Financial liberalization lifted restrictions on mortgage issuance for existing financial providers, 
which increased competition and mortgage availability, extending homeownership to 
households who would have previously been denied credit (Wainwright 2012; Malpass 2000). 
New consumer finance products funded the transfer of state owned assets to individuals, 
through a series of new programmes, including the ‘right to buy’ initiative which provided 
substantial subsidies to tenants to help them buy their home from the council. In addition, 
HAs and local councils were able to develop shared equity/ownership schemes, to assist 
households in buying a share of ownership in their rented home (Crook 1986).  
 
Despite this initial wave of privatization, many tenants continued to live in social housing. 
However, a second wave was more complex and provided HAs with a deeper role in the 
political economy’s housing provision (cf. Aalbers and Christophers 2014). This would 
radically change the structure, geographies and funding of HAs. The history of HAs is rooted 
in the 19th century, when they were developed by wealthy Victorian philanthropists and 
religious organisations (see Emsley 1986 and Tickell 1996). Initially, they provided quality 
housing for the working classes, were small in scale and supported local communities. In the 
1990s they began to grow rapidly in scale as the government began to transfer council 
housing stock into HA ownership (Malpass 2000). This phase also witnessed the 
development of new HAs to enable the removal of stock from local councils, while smaller 
associations began to merge throughout the 1990s and 2000s to provide them with 
economies of scale and operational efficiencies (Malpass 2000), while disposing of stock that 
did not fit within their geographical area. Consistent with the roll-back of the state and 
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introduction of private finance initiatives at the time (Froud and Shaoul, Froud 2003; 
Strickland 2013; Ashton, et al. 2014), the government began to view the HA sector as a 
strategic partner that could increase social housing provision with limited state involvement. 
Furthermore, the government turned to reduce HAs’ funding, with the expectation that they 
could use their substantial assets as security to access private sources of finance from 
liberalised financial markets. This plan stimulated the development of a new financial 
ecosystem and markets that would begin to financialize the third sector.  
 
3.1 Housing association financing 
 
This new ecosystem consisted of new and existing capital market intermediaries (Folkman et 
al. 2007) and institutional investors (Clark and Monk 2014). The first, an organisation called 
The Housing Finance Corporation (THFC) was established in 1987, and co-owned by the 
National Housing Federation, a representative body for HAs, and a regulatory body: The 
Housing Corporation.  THFC was known as an aggregator platform that would issue bonds to 
institutional investors, and supply loans to participating HAs, to enable them to develop new 
housing stock or to refurbish transferred stock. The collateral behind the loans was secured 
on the housing assets of participating associations, with investor returns paid from rent 
surpluses. THFC was supposed to act as a new capital market intermediary (Folkman et al. 
2007), connecting HAs to institutional investors facilitating, financialization into a new sphere 
(French et al. 2011; Engelen et al, 2014), but this particular bond market was slow to develop. 
 
As with any new market, investors seek high yields due to uncertainty, while due diligence 
processes required investors to check on the finances and business models of each 
participating HA – a cumbersome process. For HAs, bond markets and the realm of high 
finance were unfamiliar, making the process less desirable, but it did not take long for 
additional competing financial institutions to enter the market of social housing finance. 
Following the Big Bang, London’s financial services sector had access to deep interbank 
money markets with low interest rates, which witnessed the entrance of high street banks, 
who began to recycle cash into 25-30 year long term loans, as illustrated below: 
 
“And the interest fell away during the ‘90’s, then the banks started looking 
at this and saying “This looks a bit like a residential mortgage, and we 
understand that its property based, 25 year term finance” so the banks 
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started piling in.  And then two things happened really.  The banks came in, 
but also there was the stock transfer movement as Government started 
transferring stock…The banks started pricing those, and that started the 
influx of bank finance.  So late ‘90’s/early 2000’s the banks are providing 
more finance into the sector” (R15 regulator) 
 
High-street banks viewed HAs as a market straddling residential mortgages and commercial 
loans,  and through financial bricolage (Engelen et al. 2010) they came to dominate social 
housing finance. High-street banks were keen to enhance shareholder returns in a 
competitive, deregulated financial services market (Marshall et al 2011), although their 
mechanism of funding was unsustainable, facilitated by low LIBOR rates. In order to increase 
returns, banks began to sell interest rate swaps, derivatives and other services to capture 
profits from the low cost loans to HAs, placing high-street banks with substantial exposures 
to HAs real estate, which coincided with the GFC:  
 
“…banks were blatantly mis-pricing the loans they were making to the 
housing associations on the basis that however tight the pricing to Libor, 
they could then make significant additional amounts of money out of 
fixing derivatives on the loans, and other general services provided to 
housing associations…That left us with a position in 2007 where five banks 
in particular had around about, now I’m trying to think back here to find 
the specific figures, £45 – 47 billion of lending, the capital markets were by 
that stage a marginal provider” (R20 financial services) 
 
The GFC created considerable problems for high-street banks as LIBOR rates increased, but 
25-30 year loan rates had been fixed. Capital adequacy regulation viewed long commercial 
loans unfavourably, especially when governments began to stress-test banks, so they became 
keen to get HAs to refinance their debt. In some cases, lenders would search loan contracts 
to look for breaches of contract, to try and increase interest rates or force refinancing. As 
such, the collapse in liquidity from the GFC closed development finance for HAs, which 
created a new funding gap: 
 
“The [funding] gap as far as the supported sector is concerned is huge.  
But the huge funding requirement from the sector; they are looking at 
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probably about continuing to raise £5 billion or so a year…And this 
fledgling market we are working on is only going to grow” (R22 financial 
services) 
 
Following the GFC, HAs began to turn to capital markets, in order to close the funding gap 
between state subsidies and demand for new housing. Some larger HAs had already issued 
their own bonds directly to institutional markets in the 1990s.  For example, a HA raised £130 
million in bond finance in 1998, providing investors with a semi-annual coupon of 7.93%, with 
BNP Paribas in London as the arranger.1 These ‘own label’ bonds, in addition to THFC bonds 
ensured that capital market intermediaries and investors retained knowledge of the nascent 
market, which enabled it to grow, following the GFC. While the market for  residential 
securitization and property bonds had all but vanished in Europe and the US (Wainwright 
2015; Aalbers 2015) the niche HA bond market  began to develop rapidly, connecting socially-
orientated HAs directly to capital markets and exposing HAs to new pressures and 
expectations (cf. Engelen et al. 2014; Marshall et al. 2011; Pike 2006). 
 
3.2 Placing local assets in global markets: geographies of production and spatial 
implications 
 
The issuance of new social housing bonds involves the cultivation of new networks that 
connect local housing assets and revenue streams to a global investor base (cf. Marshall et al. 
2011; Wainwright 2013). Smaller, or first time bond issuers, will often enrol the support of 
specialist consultants to calculate the costs of potential government welfare changes and 
arrears on their business models, and the impact of bond repayment schedules to establish 
the most appropriate form of financing, whether it is to use an aggregator, private placement, 
own ‘branded’ issue, or drawdown facility. Larger experienced HAs will often complete this 
task themselves. The HA will then contact a specialist financial services provider, established 
high-street bank or investment bank that will arrange the financial transaction, the 
development of bond ratings and legal documentation. The arranging banks will then work to 
establish pricing and investor demand, before HA executives begin to promote the deal: 
 
“I mean the process for us probably took about three months in total.  So 
the initial part is working out your need to borrow money and how much 
                                                          
1 http://www.lqgroup.org.uk/services-for-residents/about-landq/performance-and-finance/investor-
relations/ 
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of that. And once you’ve done all that, the next stage is to choose the 
banks you want to work with.  Then we did what is called a beauty parade.  
So you get the banks to come and present and say how would they sell the 
bond and how would they ensure we would get the best price…then 
you’ve really got a couple of months of working through the legal 
documentation.  There’s reams and reams of bits of paper you have to get 
sorted out and stuff.  And then working on the investor presentation, and 
that takes a while making sure that the story is clear.  Especially if 
investors don’t know the group, the understanding of where the group is 
coming from, what it’s drivers are and where it’s going and that sort of 
stuff…And then also, I mean, the other thing that we spent quite a lot of 
time working on was just thinking about the pricing” (R10 HA) 
 
Social housing bonds are often acquired by insurance providers as part of annuity funds and 
other insurance products. While the bond yields are low, they are rated has having a low risk, 
since the revenue stream is heavily underpinned by housing benefit from the government. 
The 25-30 year long maturity of the bonds also matches the liabilities of annuity funds, which 
explains why many of the early purchasers were fund managers for British insurers, located 
in London and Edinburgh. However, the market has recently attracted a wider body of 
investors as larger issues are listed on bond market indexes, which requires the managers of 
index tracking funds to acquire the bonds, attracting larger Canadian and US investors: 
 
 “When you reach £250 million of issuance on a bond, especially a rated 
listed bond, it goes on the index, and then its benchmark bond.  And once 
it’s on the index, then a number of other insurance companies have to buy 
it essentially, because they track these indices…So then all of a sudden the 
market opens up to a good 20/25, and you see Canadian pension funds 
coming in as well; they like the product; they understand property and the 
social consequences.  Who else buys this?  You’ll see some of the big funds 
nowadays as well, seriously coming over after the big deals from the 
States… this is actually a very attractive product as a Double A, Single A 
level, as most of these investors can’t buy below investment rate” (R21 
financial services) 
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While HA bonds are consumed globally, the underlying assets, revenue and risk are strongly 
influenced by local housing and labour markets, in addition to the wider economy. 
Subsequently, space is important to arranging banks and investors in determining the risk and 
pricing of bonds. Housing stock types and HA location can have a particular effect in 
determining risk profiles. For example, a recent change to welfare policy through the 
‘Bedroom Tax’ has forced tenants on low incomes to pay additional rent for vacant rooms in 
their properties, increasing their risk of arrears. HA properties in the ‘North’ are often under 
occupied, due to an oversupply of larger properties, increasing the risk of default by bond 
issuers in the North, making investors of investing in HAs  in particular spaces: 
 
“There certainly is perhaps a divide in some areas of this in terms of north 
and south because its averse to the dreaded bedroom tax.  Well in the 
northern parts of the country there is quite a lot of under-occupation; 
what’s been built over the last 40 years is mostly family homes as well.  
You know, there could be under-occupation of one or two rooms, so 
people have been receiving benefits and they are having been asked to 
pay, and they will find it a struggle” (R22 financial services) 
 
The geographical risk inherent in local markets and the business models of HAs is also taken 
into account in valuing real-estate assets. Technically, in the case of a bond default, the 
housing assets could be repossessed by bondholders, although this scenario is considered 
unlikely, but provides reassurance to investors.2 Investors and arrangers indicted that in the 
past this has also affected the risk and pricing of bond purchases, with HAs located outside of 
London paying a premium in contrast to a London based association, as their stock, if 
repossessed, would fetch a greater price if sold to private developers (cf. Wainwright 2012).  
 
The location of HAs can also influence the complexity of their business models, which can 
also increase bondholder risk and pricing. Due to the higher operational and development 
costs of being based in London, HAs are often larger and more likely to be participate in more 
speculative activities such as building properties for private sale and rent, to cross-subside 
                                                          
2 There have been limited failures of housing associations. Following the example of the Cosmopolitan 
Housing Association (see Altair 2014), it is likely the government would attempt to find another 
housing association, or a group of associations, to take control of the property and manage the assets 
and tenants. This would protect BOTH investors and tenants. Due to political risks, it is unlikely that 
the government, or an investor, would seek to evict social housing tenants, although in an extreme 
scenario, this would be legally possible. 
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their social housing activities. While investors perceive greater security in these bond issues, 
owing to high real estate values, speculative operations can be viewed negatively, increasing 
funding costs, as highlighted below: 
 
“From a wider point of view there were certainly, and I think there still is, 
from the markets a London/South East bias.  People are very comfortable 
with the valuations and demand characteristics in London, and you get 
more and more uncertain as you move further into the regions, Scotland 
being its own question…In terms of our targets, I think we’ve always been 
looking for not necessarily simple associations, but ones which have a 
proven business model.  Obviously simple makes that an easier 
process…And certainly for smaller ones, HAs, as we mentioned before, 
their charitable desires might mean that the management has a less 
economic focus in the way they run the business.  And because of that you 
would want a simpler business model, and those seem to work fine.  For 
the larger associations, we do get control with them.  I think greater 
exposure too.  And again, particularly in London with the other additional 
things they might do that the markets dislike, have been with their shared 
ownership, those types of products” (R25 asset manager) 
 
In this sense, diversification to cross-subside social housing, while creating social value by 
participating in shared ownership, can be viewed negatively by investors and arrangers, as 
this introduces more risk by moving away from stable revenue streams provided by social 
welfare spending, which is perceived to be low risk.  
 
4. Reconciliation? Managing contradictory private-public politics across local and 
global space 
 
As discussed earlier, one shortcoming of research on financialization is the limited insight 
into how non-equity investors can influence organisations without shareholders. In the 
context of the third sector, bond investors do not have the voting rights enjoyed by 
shareholders (Froud et al 2000; Pike 2006; Muellerleile 2009) and are unable to directly 
influence the behaviour of HAs to enhance returns, or protect their investments. As such, 
they cannot influence HA behaviour once a bond has been purchased, but by implementing 
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bond covenants and introducing calculative frames and performance metrics through capital 
intermediaries (Froud et al. 2006; Miller and Rose 2008; Beunza and Garud 2007) they are 
able to influence them before an issue, through suggestions to change business plans, to 
limit future drastic changes to their operations. 
 
It must be emphasized that this power is soft as investors cannot force issuers to change 
their activities, but they can indicate what future activities they would view negatively, which 
could dissuade them purchasing bonds for that issue, but also in the future. The combination 
of metrics and soft power disciplines HAs and in doing so can restrict their activities and 
undermine their social aims (Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008): 
 
“Someone asked me the correct question quite early on in the deal about 
“What is the right level of surplus we should be making, given our social 
purpose?” and that’s a really difficult question…The types of things that 
the rating agencies and the investors are looking for are things like margin 
performance or operating surplus, operating margins, margins etc.  Now 
fundamentally those are all geared to be more profitable...So on the one 
hand they would like all those things to improve, but how do you get 
more profitable?  Well there’s a number of ways, one of them is you 
spend less on repairs, that’s probably the easiest one; obviously less staff 
etc.etc.  So there are some tensions there, but as I was saying earlier, you 
have almost got the reverse to that, which is we don’t really want you 
getting into anything other than social housing, so I know you’d like to do 
all that build for sale stuff, but that makes us a bit nervous”  (R7 housing 
association) 
 
Interviewees indicated how investors were not keen on complex business models which 
deviate from social housing due to the higher risk, despite the opportunities to grow returns, 
invest in community programmes, and provide housing for key workers, meeting social 
objectives (cf. Nicholls 2008). The metrics developed by bond rating agencies and used by 
investors can also be problematic in that they do not accommodate the diverse and strategic 
activities of HAs. Interview 5 below, outlines how attempts to become more sustainable and 
efficient, which should reduce risk to investors and enhance performance, contradicts the 
standards and metrics: 
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“And the other thing that you do get with a credit rating is you can have a 
scenario where the rating actually cuts against your strategic objectives.  
So for example, one of the objectives that we’ve got, is to rationalize our 
stock base and get out of areas that are not strategically important to us 
anymore; so for example we are moving out of London. But one of the 
measurements that the credit rating agency use in balancing their 
assessment of risk is the extent of which your business plan is predicated 
on asset sales.  Now our business plan isn’t particularly predicated in that 
sense, so it just happened that we are doing it for strategic reasons.  But 
what the credit rating agencies do is they actually measure your activity, 
not the purpose behind it…therefore they will look at your asset disposals 
and say “Oooh, you are shedding a lot of assets.  You are getting a lot of 
money through assets disposals, therefore you are a higher risk 
organization” and “By the way, we’ve dropped your credit rating.” “(R5 
housing association) 
 
Organisational change, even for legitimate strategic purposes can trigger bond market 
downgrades, which increases the cost of future bond issues, removing future cash that could 
be deployed in creating more social and affordable housing, or supporting communities. 
Subsequently, limitations in the assessment of risk and unique characteristics of HAs can 
undermine their activities, highlighting the tensions with financialization in the third sector.  
Interestingly, financialization within the sector has stimulated new innovations and practices 
to reassure investors, but which have also been beneficial for tenants. Recent changes to 
welfare payments including the Bedroom Tax, incoming Universal Credit and direct payments 
have created new potential risks to timely rent payments, reducing available revenue, which 
could trigger a bond default. Despite initial concerns by stakeholders in the social housing 
sector, new innovations to reassure investors that this risk is being managed have been 
successful, while limiting the difficulties for tenants struggling to pay their rent, while 
providing additional training and support:  
“Well, the whole welfare reform has in fact led to a beneficial impact on 
our cashflow, because we have put a lot more effort into collecting the 
rents.  So we have spent quite a lot of money on automating processes, 
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bringing in things like text messaging, so the people get an automatic 
text…We have also invested in benefit advisors so we find that quite a lot 
of people are getting more benefits than they were before because we 
have put the effort into helping them optimise their income.  We have 
also spent money on employment and training programmes, which are 
helping tenants get employment, because once you are working, the caps 
and everything else become less relevant...And also, we've been spending 
money on effectively supporting people to move to a new home…And 
quite interestingly, the number of people in under-occupation is pretty 
well the same number of people in over-occupation, albeit they are not 
necessarily in the same towns, because we have quite a big spread of 
geography.  And obviously it requires people to want to move… we 
support, we help fund the cost of the house swaps, because it's a win-win 
situation.  One finds it easier to pay the rent, and the other finds that 
they've got a home that's big enough for them” (R2 housing association) 
 
However, these innovations have not always been positive for tenants, and in some cases 
HAs have begun to undermine their own social objectives in providing housing for low 
income households. These associations have begun to undertake close analyses of their 
tenant portfolio, investigating what proportion of tenants are supported living, working 
families on low incomes, and the unemployed. In order to reduce the likelihoods of future 
arrears and defaults, some organisations are actively managing new applications to reject 
households deemed high risk, moving towards practices employed in the private rental 
sector:  
 
“There is evidence that there are changes both in allocations and then 
practice towards arrears in the tenancies.  So we are increasingly seeing 
housing associations not accepting nominations, as I say, the Council 
nominates a household to go into housing association property, if they are 
on benefits the housing associations increasingly are trying to just reject 
the nomination. We are seeing safeguards against bedroom tax, working 
tenants who are paying their rent in themselves, being told that they can’t 
take properties where they would be under occupying and liable for the 
bedroom tax if they did lose their job” (R16 stakeholder) 
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The adoption of sharper commercial practices has emerged from the growth of HAs through 
mergers and diversification, making them more complex, especially in their use of financial 
markets. This has led to a transition towards a more corporate culture through 
financialization, focusing on finance-led growth, returns and organisational performance. As 
illustrated below, the financialization of HAs has begun to demote the importance of social 
objectives in supporting local communities in some organisations: 
 
“I mean big housing associations, sadly they’ve lost their focus on the 
social bit, I would argue…I am thinking of Association X in London.  I forget 
the name of the people that did that but they seemed to have completely 
dismantled a local community by shifting them all over London and 
uprooted them, just to build some new cutting edge state of the art social 
housing and new private build next to a train station.  That will be 
snapped up by bankers” (R6 housing association) 
 
While the financialization of HAs has enabled them to bridge a funding gap left by the 
withdrawal of state funding, it has also introduced new politics to the sector to protect 
investor returns. While accessing international capital markets has been successful for 
meeting finance needs, it is clear that the financialization of the sector has developed new 
pressures that have seen larger associations begin to drift from their social objectives. 
Subsequently, some organisations are focussing on protecting their reputations in the eyes 
of investors through performance management metrics and standards, while constraining 
their ability to create organisations that can assist local communities.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Following the GFC, there has been a marked increase in the growth of study into 
financialization and real-estate. However, two important shortcomings have emerged within 
the literature. First, researchers, with a few limited exceptions, have overlooked the 
financialisation of third sector organisations such as HAs (Engelen et al. 2014; Aalbers et al. 
2015; Jakovljevic 2008), which have begun to make extensive use of capital markets. Second, 
scholars examining financialization in real-estate have underestimated the complexity of the 
processes that (re)shape real-estate organisations and their activities, through bond 
programmes. In addressing these two research gaps, we argue that financialization utilises a 
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different set of practices to discipline organisations involved in the funding and provision of 
housing, through capital market participation. In doing so, we have sought to provide deeper 
insight into how HAs have become deeply entwined in capital markets, and how they have 
undergone organisational change, developing new plans and processes to enable them to 
access bond markets, which have had some positive, and less positive, impacts on HAs and 
their tenants.  
Specifically, we have uncovered how the social objectives of the third sector have been 
challenged by the power of financialisation, capital market intermediaries and asset 
managers, a wider consequence of the roll-back of the state. As such, the paper provides 
new insight into how financialization has begun to permeate the third sector, and the 
processes through which it can do so. This provides new insight into how financialization 
processes differ outside of private sector financialization, particularly in the context of real-
estate, and builds upon the current literature (cf. French et al. 2011; Aalbers and 
Christophers 2014).  In addition, our paper also draws attention to the spatial implications of 
HAs and financialization. Our study demonstrates how regional labour markets and demand 
for accommodation, tenure and land price can shape the activities of HAs, but also how local 
dynamics can shape the risk perceptions of investors, affecting the cost of social housing 
funding. As such, it can be more expensive for smaller HAs outside of London to obtain 
funding to (re)develop their housing assets. The paper also disentangles the geographies of 
capital market intermediaries and investors that constitute the market which enables the 
financialization of HAs (cf. Lennartz 2011; Folkman et al. 2007), through a mixture of London 
based high-street banks, boutique financial companies and investment banks, through to 
Edinburgh-based asset managers and increasingly North American investors, extending the 
networks of investors, who are able to discreetly influence the business plans and strategies 
of HAs, to protect their investments and to secure their returns. Interestingly, the paper 
revealed how investors have been seeking replacement real-estate investment opportunities, 
that offer low risk and steady returns which can replace substantially reduced securitization 
markets (Wainwright 2015). 
The paper raises broader questions about the impact and extension of financialization and its 
introduction and modification of new management techniques, metrics and knowledges 
(Engelen et al. 2010; Beunza and Garud 2007), which reshape the activities of the third 
sector through a more commercial lens, which has begun to challenge the supremacy of 
social value over economic value creation for HAs. While an emergent HA bond market has 
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filled an investment gap developed by the roll-back of state investment, it is questionable 
that these organisations are able to raise cheaper capital independently, than if the state 
was to issue treasury bonds to support the financial needs of HAs. This shift to an off-balance 
funding approach for the government, facilitated through financialization, has created new 
opportunities for capital market intermediaries, but has increased funding costs and fees, 
resources that could have been used to support vulnerable households, while more 
questionable practices which have emerged can have a direct negative effect on vulnerable 
households (cf. Emerson and Twersky 1996; Nicholls 2008). The outcomes for different 
stakeholders are mixed: the government has reduced its funding costs; capital intermediaries 
earn fees, while risk is transferred to asset managers and vulnerable households, where the 
former can absorb risk (Folkman et al. 2007, but the latter cannot, exposing vulnerable 
households to risks of eviction, waiting lists and rent increases.  
We argue that further research is needed to explore how financialization has begun to 
permeate the third sector and challenge the social objectives of non-private organisations. 
While earlier studies of financialization have been applied to the private sector (Muellerleile 
2009; Langley 2007; Pike 2006), which is more closely aligned with the politics of 
financialization, the permeation of high-finance into HAs, which prioritise social value 
creation have arguably had a deeper impact on the strategic orientation, values and 
practices of these organisations. This has required the translation of market knowledges, 
cultural change and financial performance metrics (Manville and Broad 2013;  Miller and 
Rose 2008; Engelen et al. 2010), which remain understudied in the third sector context. 
Economic geographers and social scientists need to turn and seriously examine the 
permeation of financialization into the third sector, to examine the new spaces and 
institutions which it is beginning to reshape. 
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Table 1: Key HA sector events 
Year Event Effect 
1113 Hospital of St Cross founded Longest constantly serving HA founded 
1980 Housing Act Right to Buy and Shared Ownership begin 
privatization of public housing 
1987 THFC established Opening of bond market finance for HAs 
1986 Big Bang' Financial services able to develop new products 
1988 Housing Act Enabled lenders to take possession against HA 
property 
1988 Large Scale Voluntary Stock 
Transfers begin 
Increased demand for external funding 
1998 L&Q HA launches first own 
label bond 
Own label bonds emerge 
2008 Global Financial Crisis begins Reduced commercial loans for HAs 
2009 Sanctuary HA issues new 
bonds 
First own label issuance in 5 years - renewed 
activity 
2012 Welfare Reform Act Reduced tenant benefits through 'Bedroom Tax' 
and Universal Credit 
2013 Cosmopolitan HA take over Concern over leveraged HA business models 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Table 2: Main commercial loan providers and capital market arrangers 
Commercial Loan 
Providers 
Capital Market 
Arrangers 
Lloyds Lloyds 
Barclays Barclays 
Santander Santander 
RBS RBS 
Tridos Royal Bank of Canada 
Nationwide HSBC 
 
Trade Risks 
 
THFC 
 
GB Social Housing 
 
Canaccord Genuity 
Sources: THFC (2016); Authors 
 
Table 3: Growth and debt in the HA sector (2006-2015) 
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Year 
Sector 
Debt 
(£Bn) 
Debt 
per 
Unit 
(£) 
HA 
Development 
Grant (£M) 
Total 
Assets 
(£M) 
Number of 
Homes 
Managed 
2006 28.3 13,658 27,642 41,795 2,011,892 
2007 30.9 14,111 30,383 45,946 2,127,082 
2008 34.9 15,013 32,719 50,989 2,266,004 
2009 40 16,588 35,628 57,415 2,337,286 
2010 43 17,034 38,478 60,424 2,430,619 
2011 44.5 17,226 41,118 65,404 2,527,082 
2012 48.5 20,400 41,616 71,150 2,551,126 
2013 55.7 21,313 41,602 72,788 2,613,275 
2014 59.3 22,598 41,984 78,179 2,623,005 
2015 63.4 23,931 42,487 83,611 2,647,395 
Sources: HC (2007), TSA (2008; 2009; 2010; 2011) and HCA (2012; 2013; 2014; 2015)  
 
Table 4: Public Bond issues 2013-2015 
Year Issuer  Value (£)  Cost of funding (%) 
2013 THFC 
              
55,200,000  4.31 
2013 Saffron 
            
125,000,000  4.64 
2013 THFC 
              
81,500,000  4.5 
2013 A2Dominion 
            
150,000,000  4.5 
2013 Sanctuary 
            
150,000,000  4.2 
2013 Grand Union 
            
150,000,000  4.63 
2013 Peabody 
            
350,000,000  4.63 
2013 Aster 
            
250,000,000  4.6 
2013 Chelmer 
            
200,000,000  4.79 
2014 Southern 
              
50,000,000  5.36 
2014 Southern 
            
125,000,000  4.55 
2014 East Midlands 
            
200,000,000  4.6 
2014 Notting Hill Housing 
            
250,000,000  4.47 
2014 Thrive 
            
125,000,000  4.68 
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2014 BPHA 
            
200,000,000  4.82 
2014 GB Social Housing 
              
47,700,000  4.82 
2014 Radian 
            
200,000,000  4.82 
2014 Radian 
            
100,000,000  4.82 
2014 Affordable Housing Finance 
            
208,000,000  3.76 
2014 Town and Country 
              
80,000,000  4.67 
2014 Boston Mayflower 
            
150,000,000  4.3 
2014 A2Dominion 
            
150,000,000  4.5 
2014 Cross Keys 
            
150,000,000  4.3 
2014 Walsall 
            
250,000,000  4.28 
2014 Guinness 
            
100,000,000  4 
2014 Yorkshire 
            
200,000,000  4.23 
2014 Affordable Housing Finance 
            
198,000,000  3.3 
2014 Wheatley 
            
300,000,000  4.4 
2014 Herefordshire 
            
120,000,000  4.19 
2014 Riverside 
              
25,000,000  4 
2015 Paragon 
              
25,000,000  3.63 
2015 Richmond Housing 
            
175,000,000  3.302 
2015 Swan 
            
250,000,000  3.63 
2015 Affordable Housing Finance 
            
194,000,000  2.92 
2015 Orbit 
            
250,000,000  3.61 
2015 GB Social Housing 
              
16,800,000  3.88 
2015 Affordable Housing Finance 
            
208,000,000  2.89 
2015 Metropolitan 
            
250,000,000  4.2 
2015 L&Q 
              
25,000,000  3.84 
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Source: THFC Market Data (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: HA debt by sector and unit 
 
Sources: Sources: HC (2007), TSA (2008; 2009; 2010; 
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